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Abstract: In this paper, using the EU-SILC 2006 data-set, we seek to explore the 
extent to which a consideration of welfare regime and socio-economic differences in 
poverty levels and patterns and variation in the consequences of poverty for economic 
stress can assist us in making informed choices between alternative poverty 
indicators. Poverty in the EU is normally defined in terms of income thresholds 
defined at the level of each member state. However, the enlargement of the EU and 
the consequent widening of the gap in living standards between the richest and the 
poorest member states has had the consequence that a country such as Ireland perform 
poorly in comparison with a number of the New Member States (NMS) despite 
enjoying obvious advantages in terms of material living standards. Such paradoxical 
findings have produced a number of different but interrelated responses. The first 
focuses on the limitations imposed by an entirely national frame of reference. An 
alternative critique takes as its starting point the fact that low income is an unreliable 
indicator of poverty. In this paper we seek to explore the strength of both critiques by 
comparing the outcomes associated with measuring being ‘at risk of poverty’ and 
consistent poverty at both national and EU levels. Our analysis suggest that it is 
possible to develop an approach that would allow us to achieve the stated EU 
objective of assessing the scale of exclusion from minimally acceptable level of 
standards of living in individual countries while also measuring the extent to which 
the whole population of Europe is sharing in the benefits of high average prosperity. 
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Comparing Poverty Indicators in an Enlarged EU 
 
Introduction 
 
In this paper, using the EU-SILC 2006 data-set, we seek to explore the extent to 
which a consideration of welfare regime and socio-economic variation in poverty 
levels and patterns and variation in the consequences of poverty for subjectively 
experienced economic stress can inform our understanding of the strengths and 
weaknesses of alternative poverty indicators.  
 
Poverty in the EU is normally defined in terms of income thresholds defined at the 
level of each member state. The ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator identifies those 
individuals falling below 60% of the national median disposable equivalent income 
appropriately adjusted for household composition. The conceptual foundations of this 
approach can be found in Townsend’s (1979) definition of poverty as ‘exclusion from 
ordinary living patterns and activities due to lack of resources’. Those falling more 
than a certain ‘distance’ below a certain nationally defined income level are 
understood to be excluded from a minimally acceptable way of life.  
 
The current set of common EU-indicators of poverty and social exclusion used in the 
context of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) relies heavily on such measures. 
The emphasis on a purely relative perspective, taking conditions in one’s own country 
as the benchmark, has been justified by the European Commission in the following 
terms: 
“An absolute notion is considered less relevant for the EU for two basic reasons. First 
the challenge for Europe is to make the whole population share the benefits of high 
average prosperity and not to reach basic standards of living as in developed parts of 
the world. Secondly, what is regarded as minimal acceptable living standards depends 
largely on the general level of social and economic development, which tends to vary 
considerably across countries (European Commission, 2004).  
 
However, the enlargement of the EU and the consequent widening of the gap in living 
standards between the richest and the poorest member states has had the consequence 
that a country such as Ireland performs poorly in comparison with a number of the 
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New Member States (NMS) despite enjoying obvious advantages in terms of material 
living standards. As Guio (2005a) observes, such findings have provoked concern 
about the ability of the current portfolio of indicators to satisfactorily reflect the 
situation of the New Member States and facilitate meaningful comparison between 
them and the ‘old’ Member States. Förster (2005:32) notes that the labelling of the 
relative income measure as ‘at risk of poverty’ reflects the tendency of governments 
to interpret it as an indicator of inequality in income distribution rather than as a 
measure of poverty as such. 
 
These paradoxical findings have produced a number of different but interrelated 
responses. The first focuses on the limitations imposed by the entirely national frame 
of reference. Fahey (2007) argues for the development of an EU-wide measure 
alongside a nationally relative measure and recent exercises of this sort include 
Brandolini (2007) Kangas and Ritakallio (2007). i An alternative critique takes as its 
starting point the fact that a variety of studies in industrialized countries have shown 
that low income is an unreliable indicator of poverty in this sense, failing to identify 
those experiencing the forms of deprivation that one would expect to characterises 
those excluded from customary living patterns. ii 
 
In this paper we seek to explore the strength of both critiques by comparing the 
outcomes associated with measuring being ‘at risk of poverty’ and consistent poverty 
at both national and EU levels. By consistent poverty we mean being both below a 
relevant income threshold such as 60% of equivalized income and being above a 
specified material deprivation threshold. Such a measure has been employed in 
Ireland for some timeiii and has recently been applied on a comparative basis by 
Förster (2005). 
 
Our analysis is based on data from EU-SILC 2006 covering 26 countries. Since our 
purpose is to facilitate evaluation of the merits of different measures of poverty, rather 
than to provide a descriptive account of European poverty and deprivation patternsiv, 
our focus will be at the level of welfare regime. Since, our purpose is to explore the 
relative merits of different poverty indicators rather than provide a detailed account of 
welfare regime variation in the impact of socio-demographic factors, we focus on the 
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interaction between welfare regime and the principal economic status of the 
household reference person (HRP). 
 
As Gallie and Paugam (2000:3-4) observe, a welfare regime refers to a system of 
public regulation that is concerned to assure the protection of individuals and to 
maintain social cohesion by intervening, through both legal measures and the 
distribution of resources. The usefulness of a regime model may vary between welfare 
domains. In developing their ‘employment regime’ typology; they focus on the degree 
of benefit coverage and level of financial compensation for the unemployed and the 
scale of active employment policies.  Bukodi and Róbert (2007) add a related concern 
with the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) comprising a set of 
rules governing the hiring and firing process that can be provided through labour 
legislation and collective bargaining arrangements. Combining these criteria with 
those reflected in the standard Esping-Andersen categorisation they distinguish six 
welfare regimes, which we employ in our subsequent analysis, as follows: 
 
• The social democratic regime assigns the welfare state a substantial 
redistributive role. A high level of employment flexibility is combined with 
high security in the form of generous social welfare and unemployment 
benefits to guarantee adequate economic resources independently of market or 
familial reliance. We have included Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, 
Norway and Netherlands in this cluster. v 
 
• The corporatist regime involves less emphasis on redistribution and views 
welfare primarily as a mediator of group-based mutual aid and risk pooling, 
with rights to benefits depending on being already inserted in the labour 
market. Relatively strict EPL policies are aimed at protecting established 
inside worker and involve mainly passive labour market policies. This cluster 
includes Germany, Austria, Belgium, France and Luxembourg. 
 
• The liberal regime acknowledges the primacy of the market and confines the 
state to a residual welfare role, social benefits typically being subject to a 
means test and targeted on those failing in the market. These countries exhibit 
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levels of flexibility coupled with limited measures to actively sustain 
employment.vi The UK and Ireland constitute this group. 
 
• The southern European regime is distinguished by the crucial role of family 
support systems. Labour market policies are poorly developed and selective. 
The benefit system is uneven and minimalist in nature and lacks a guaranteed 
minimum income provision. This group comprises Cyprus, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain. 
 
•  Alber et al. (2007) and Juhász (2006) note the difficulties involved in 
categorising the welfare regimes of post-socialist countries and the extent of 
variation across them, although low levels of spending on social protection 
and weakness of social rights are common. Bukodi and Róbert (2007) note 
that their has been a general increase in employment flexibility with most 
transition countries displaying a level of labour market flexibility significantly 
less than the UK but significantly greater than in southern European. Cedefop 
(2001) conclude that the Baltic countries, have gradually moved away from a 
model of regulated inclusion to one characterised by competitive regulation. 
Bukodi and Róbert (2007) distinguish two clusters within this overall group. 
The corporatist post-socialist regime comprises the central European countries, 
with mostly transfer oriented labour market measures and a moderate degree 
of employment protection.The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia 
and Slovakia are included in this cluster. 
 
• The post-socialist liberal cluster comprises the Baltic countries which are 
characterised by a more flexible labour market, with employers, particularly in 
the private sector, unwilling to abide by legal regulation of the market, and an 
absence of policies aimed at sustaining employment. Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania are included in this group. 
 
Our purpose in analysing variation in poverty rates by welfare regime and HRP PES 
is to provide a basis for an evaluation of the validity of different indicators. This 
assessment is undertaken from a construct validity perspective in which the adequacy 
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of an indicator is evaluated by considering its relationship to other key indicators in 
light of our prior theoretical expectations of how such a measure should behave. 
 
Below we set our understanding of how an indicator of poverty should vary across 
welfare regimes and the HRP PES of the household in which the individual is located. 
In so doing it is necessary to take into account that poverty rates will vary across and 
within welfare regimes not only in relation to underlying distributional and 
employment regulation principles but also with respect to the level of resources 
available in the constituent societies. 
 
A satisfactory measure of poverty should identify a minority in each society 
experiencing ‘exclusion from customary living standards due to lack of resources who 
are excluded from customary living patterns’.  
 
The number identified as poor will vary in line with the overall level of prosperity in 
the society and with the characteristics of the welfare regime but that the patterns that 
emerge will be significantly influenced by the poverty indicator under consideration. 
We anticipate low poverty rates for social-democratic regimes, somewhat higher 
levels for corporatist and liberal regimes, intermediate levels for the southern 
European cluster, significantly higher levels for the post-socialist corporatist group 
and the highest levels for the post-socialist liberal cluster. 
 
We also expect systematic variation within regimes by employment status of the 
household reference person but that such variation will differ from one welfare regime 
to another. We anticipate that individuals in households where the HRP is in full-time 
employment will be largely insulated from poverty in the social democratic, 
corporatist and liberal regimes but that this will be less true in relation to the 
remaining clusters. Where the HRP is part-time employed we expect that poverty 
rates will be proportionately higher. 
 
The social democratic regime should display the lowest poverty rates where the HRP 
is retired or excluded from the labour market as in case of inactivity, illness/disability 
and unemployment with the rate for the final group being distinctively high. We also 
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expect the corporatist groups to display the next lowest rates in relation to retirement 
and those groups excluded from the labour market. For the remaining employment 
status categories we expect significantly higher rates for all these groups in the 
remaining regimes but with both liberal regimes exhibiting distinctively high levels in 
comparison with regimes enjoying comparable levels of affluence and the retired in 
the post-socialist corporatist cluster enjoying a particular advantage over the other 
groups excluded from the labour market.  
 
 We expect that within regime relativities between employees and the remaining 
groups would be significantly stronger in the liberal, social democratic and corporatist 
clusters than in the remaining regimes. In consequence, we would also expect that 
between regime differences in poverty risks would be greater in the employee 
categories than in the remaining ones and would be likely to be weakest for the 
unemployed.  
 
We also expect that a valid indicator of poverty will distinguish appropriately between 
those experiencing subjective economic stress and all others.  
 
Data and measures 
 
The Eurostat User Database EU-SILC 2006 covers 26 countries, 24 EU members 
states (Malta not being in the survey) as well as Norway and Iceland. The household 
survey is made of 202,978 households which is a total of 536,993 individuals. The 
sample sizes across countries range from 8,598 individuals in Iceland to 54,512 in 
Italy. The unit of analysis is the individual. 
 
The income measure we employ throughout this publication is the annual total 
household disposable income adjusted for household size using the OECD modified 
equivalence scale. The income reference period is the 12 months prior to date of 
interview. 
 
Our analysis of deprivation focuses on a 7-item index of ‘consumption deprivation’ 
that comprises items ranging from enforced absence relating to current requirement 
such as food and heat to more general consumption items such as being able to afford 
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a holiday, a car or a PC, as well as avoiding arrears on regular bills such as rent or 
utilities. Confirmatory factor analysis reveals that this dimension emerges as a distinct 
factor with loadings ranging from 0.889 for ‘a weeks holiday away from home’ to 
0.565 for arrears. vii For the 24 EU countries the Cronbach alpha is 0.72. Relatively 
little variation is observed across welfare regimes with alpha ranging from 0.67 to 
0.73.  
 
The items conform to the stipulation by Guio (2005a:2) that appropriates indicators 
should fulfil the following requirements:  
• Reflect the lack of an ordinary living pattern common to a majority of the 
population in the European Union and most of its member states. 
• Allow international comparisons. 
• Allow comparison over time. 
• Be responsive to changes in the level of living of people. 
 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Focusing first on ‘at risk of poverty’ (ARP), we 
produce measures at national level and for the 24 EU countries included in the EU-
SILC 2006 data-set (EUARP). We then produce a number of consistent poverty 
measures across geographic units. These indicators are constructed by combining 
information on ‘at risk of poverty’ and consumption deprivation. The three indicators 
are as follows: 
 
• A national consistent poverty (NCP) indicator. This is constructed by 
choosing a deprivation threshold at the national level that identifies a fraction 
of the population that corresponds as closely as possible to the number below 
the 60% of the national median equivalised income. This approach will affect 
national rankings only to the extent that the income and deprivation measures 
overlap more closely in some countries rather than others. 
 
• The second measure is an EU consistent poverty (EUCP) measure. In this case 
those defined as consistently poor are both the ‘at risk of poverty’ using the 
EU threshold and above the deprivation threshold that identifies a fraction of 
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the population as close as possible to that found below the corresponding 
income threshold. 
 
• The final measure constructed is a mixed level consistent poverty (MLCP) 
indicator combining income information at the national level with information 
relating to consumption deprivation at the EU-level. The procedure involves 
identifying a fraction of the EU population as a whole that corresponds as 
closely as possible to the number below the EU ‘at risk of poverty’ line 
relating to 60% of the median of the equivalent income. In this case, in order 
to be defined as poor, an individual must be located below the national ‘at risk 
of poverty’ threshold and above the corresponding EU consumption 
deprivation threshold.  
 
At national and European levels we have adopted a strictly relative approach in 
defining deprivation thresholds. Setting the thresholds in terms of the numbers being 
‘at risk of poverty’ means that the numbers deprived cannot vary independently of the 
levels of ‘at risk of poverty’. However, since one of our main objectives is to consider 
how the latter measures behave this has the advantage that it allows for the range of 
agreement between the measures to ranges from zero to one. 
  
The measure to which this argument does not apply is the mixed consistent poverty 
measure which combines a  national relative threshold in relation to income and a 
European relative threshold for deprivation derived from the corresponding income 
threshold. At first glance, this may appear to combine an absolute approach to 
deprivation material deprivation with a relative approach to income. At a particular 
point in time this is true. Thus for the EU-SILC 2006 data set, an individual will be 
defined as experiencing mixed consistent poverty if they fall below 60% of national 
relative income and are above the EU deprivation threshold of 0.266 on the weighted 
consumption deprivation index. The latter corresponds to a raw mean of 2.797 on the 
7-item index.  However, given the manner in which we have defined the deprivation 
threshold it will change as the number below the EU ‘at risk of poverty line’ declines 
or rises.  
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Poverty outcomes by type of indicator and welfare regime 
 
In Table 1 we set out the distribution of poverty levels by type of indicator and 
welfare regime. Where we are providing population estimates we use the grossing 
weight relating to population size. However, where our focus in on relationships we 
refrain from doing so and our analysis thus assumes that relationships are uniform 
within regimes. In this latter case we exclude Luxembourg because the combination 
of small population and the distinctive nature of the observations relating to it would 
distort our findings.  Focusing first on the NARP rate, we can see that the lowest 
observed rate of 11.1 per cent is observed for the social democratic regime. This rises 
to 13 per cent for the corporatist regime. It then rises to 19.2 and 19.7 per cent 
respectively for the liberal and southern European regimes. The post-socialist 
corporatist rate is somewhat lower at 16.3 per cent while the highest level of 20.7 per 
cent is observed for the post-socialist liberal. 
 
The foregoing pattern of results clearly does not conform to the expectations we 
outlined earlier. This is particularly true in relation to the comparison between the 
liberal and southern European regimes and the post socialist clusters where societies 
that we know to be significantly less affluent display poverty rates that are lower, or at 
least not particularly higher, than those we know to be much more favourably placed 
in this regard. Does shifting from a unidimensional to a multidimensional perspective 
produce a more plausible ranking of regimes? A consideration of the results relating 
to the NCP indicator shows this is not to be the case. This measure takes into account 
the extent of the overlap within countries between low income and high levels of 
material deprivation. The approach is multidimensional but remains purely relative in 
focusing solely on the distribution of both variables within regimes. Implementing 
this approach produces a substantial reduction in poverty rates ranging from a halving 
to a reduction to less than one third of their original level.  
 
These finding provide unequivocal support for the argument that low income on its 
own provides an inadequate basis for capturing exclusion from ordinary living 
patterns. However, there is no evidence that variation in the strength of the 
relationship between income and deprivation across regime helps to account for the 
corresponding distribution of NARP. The overlap is weakest at 32 and 36 per cent for 
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the social democratic and corporatist, it is higher at 47 per cent for the liberal regime 
than for the remaining regimes where the level ranges between 41 to 44 per cent. 
Contrary to the argument that the ‘at risk of poverty’ measures proves to be less 
effective in identifying those excluded from customary living patterns in the New 
Member States, it is in fact precisely in those societies where they prove to be most 
effective in identifying those most exposed to material deprivation. The most serious 
challenge to the successful application of NARP approach as a means of identifying 
the most excluded individuals within a country does not arise from EU enlargement as 
such but from the long established fact that the assumptions underlying Townsend’s 
relative income approach cannot be sustained in the more affluent EU societies.viii 
 
The outcome for the NCP indicator is that the social democratic and corporatist 
regimes continue to display the lowest poverty rates with figures of 3.4 and 4.6 per 
cent. They are again followed by the post-socialist corporatist group with a rate of 7.1 
and the southern European with one of 8.1 per cent. The highest rates of 9.0 and 9.2 
per cent respectively are observed for the liberal and post-socialist liberal regimes. 
 
Table 1: National and EU ‘at Risk of Poverty’ (ARP) and Consistent Poverty 
(CP)Rates by Country 
 NARP NCP  EUARP  EUCP  MCP 
 % % % % % 
Social Democratic  11.1 3.4 6.1 1.8 3.2 
Liberal 19.2 9.0 9.8 3.4 6.2 
Corporatist 13.0 4.6 9.0 4.0 5.7 
Southern European 19.7 8.1 22.9 9.0 7.9 
Post-socialist 
Corporatist 
16.3 7.1 65.2 38.4 12.4 
Post-socialist 
 Liberal 
20.7 9.2 74.1 42.1 15.6 
 
If shifting to a multidimensional perspective does not produce the desired profile, can 
this be achieved by shifting from a national to an EU perspective? We consider the 
outcomes associated with such a shift initially in relation to ‘at risk of poverty’. The 
EUARP indicator does produce a much sharper pattern of differentiation between 
regimes in line with levels of societal affluence. The lowest rates of 6.1 and 9.0 per 
cent are again observed for the social democratic and corporatist regimes with that for 
the liberal cluster being marginally higher at 9.8 per cent. We then observe a sharp 
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increase to 22.9 per cent for the southern European regime. A further sharp escalation 
then occurs for the corporatist and liberal post-socialist clusters with rates of 
respectively 65.2 and 74.1. Thus the desired differentiation between more and less 
affluent regimes is achieved but at the price of this contrast entirely dominating the 
results and the need to accept as valid a poverty indicator that identifies between two-
thirds to three-quarter of individuals in the post-socialist clusters as poor. 
 
Adopting a multidimensional perspective at the EU level, as with the EUCP indicator, 
brings about an improvement in this situation. Unlike the situation at the national 
level, the overlap is actually greatest for the post-socialist regimes, intermediate for 
the corporatist and southern European clusters and lowest for the liberal and social 
democratic regimes. The poverty rate falls to 1.8 for the social democratic cluster, 
followed by the liberal and corporatist groups with levels of 3.4 and 4.0 per cent 
respectively. It then rises to 9.0 per cent for the southern European regime before 
climbing sharply to 38.4 and 42.1 per cent respectively for the corporatist and post-
socialist liberal clusters. While we observe a significant reduction in poverty levels, 
the extent of the overlap between low income and high levels of deprivation in the 
post-socialist clusters require us to accept an outcome in which approximately four 
out of ten individuals in those societies are defined as poor.  
 
Our final indicator the MCP measure combines a relative income approach with an 
EU deprivation threshold. The pattern of overlap in relation to low income and 
deprivation is rather different in this case. The lowest level of overlap of 23.4 per cent 
is observed in relation to the social democratic regime. This rises to 29.5 per cent for 
the liberal regime before increasing to 37 and 39 per cent respectively for the southern 
European and corporatist clusters. In contrast for the post-socialist regimes three out 
of four of those falling below the NARP threshold are also found above the EU 
deprivation threshold. The outcome, in terms of poverty rates, is that the lowest rate of 
3.2 per cent is observed for the social democratic regime. Rather similar rates of 5.7 
and 6.2 per cent are observed respectively for the corporatist and liberal clusters. A 
shift from an entirely relative focus on deprivation to one using a EU benchmark 
clearly favours the former over the latter. We then observe a gradual increase to 7.9 
per cent for the southern European group, 12.4 per cent for the post-socialist 
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corporatist cluster and 15.6 for the post-socialist liberal regime. The MCP measure 
therefore provides a pattern of regime differentiation consistent with our expectations. 
 
In Table 2 the results deriving from a set of logistic regression summarise the welfare 
regime relativities for the five poverty indicators that we have employed. In each case 
the social democratic regime serves as the benchmark and is assigned an odds ratio of 
1. All other outcomes are then expressed as multiples of the risk of being poor in the 
social democratic group. For the NARP group we see that variation is extremely 
modest with the liberal, southern European and post socialist clusters all located in a 
narrow range running from 2.1 to 2.3. Switching to the NCP measure serves to 
differentiate the social democratic regime more sharply from the remaining clusters. 
However, it has little effect on the pattern of differentials between the former groups. 
The odds ratios for the liberal, southern European and post socialist liberal regimes 
range from 2.8 to 3.2. Switching to the EU level in relation to ‘at risk of poverty’ 
leads the post socialist corporatist cluster odds ratio to increase to 21.3 and the post-
socialist liberal regime one to 48.1. For the southern European regime a much more 
modest disparity of 5.5 is observed and the respective figures for the liberal and 
corporatist regimes are 2.0 and 1.6.  
 
Moving to the consistent poverty indicator at the European level a relatively similar 
pattern is observed. However, the odds ratio for the post-socialist liberal regime falls 
to 37.1 while those for the remaining regimes increase modestly. It remains true that 
the major contrast is between the post-socialist regimes and all others. Finally, the 
MCP measure, which combines both national and EU perspectives, produces the kind 
of graduated pattern of differentiation across welfare regimes that we would expect to 
be associated with a valid poverty indicator. The odds on individuals in the corporatist 
cluster experiencing this form of poverty are 1.9 times higher than for their 
counterparts in the social democratic regime. This rises to 2.4 for the liberal regime 
and to 2.9 for the southern European. It then rises to 3.7 and 5.4 for the corporatist and 
liberal post-socialist regimes. 
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Table 2: Logistic Regression Effect for Welfare Regimes for National and European 
‘At Risk of Poverty’(ARP)  and Consistent Poverty (CP)  
 NARP NCP  EUARP  EUCP  MCP 
 odds 
ratios* 
odds 
ratios 
odds 
ratios 
odds 
ratios 
odds 
ratios 
Social Democratic 
(ref) 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Corporatist 1.326 1.589 1.632 2.281 1.885 
Liberal 2.084 3.151 1.983 2.594 2.416 
Southern European 2.188 2.786 5.463 6.302 2.935 
Post –socialist 
Corporatist 
1.561 2.052 21.345 27.005 3.735 
Post –socialist 
Liberal 
2.306 3.225 48.085 37.193 5.372 
Nagelkerke R2 .019 .021 .332 .240 .036 
N 516,534 504,120 516,534 504,120 504,120 
*All significant at p<0.001  
 
The combined effect of welfare regime and principal economic status 
of the HRP on poverty outcomes by type of indicator  
 
In this section we extend our analysis by considering not only welfare regime effects 
but also the impact of the principal employment status (PES) of the HRP and the 
manner in which they interact. In assessing the relative merits of the different poverty 
indicators, we have chosen to focus on the HRP PES both because it is likely to be the 
most powerful socio-economic predictor of poverty and because of the expectation 
that its impact will be significantly mediated by welfare regime.  In Table 3 we show 
the results of a set of logistic regression with each of our five indicators in turn being 
taken as independent variables. The independent variables comprise a set of dummy 
variables relating to welfare regimes with the social democratic category taken as the 
reference category and a set of dummies referring to PES HRP with full-time 
employees as the benchmark.ix The effect of being in part-time employment is kept 
uniform but the impact of all other categories is allowed to vary across welfare 
regime. In each case the set of interaction proves to be highly significant. In what 
follows we seek to illustrate graphically and discuss, for each of the poverty 
indicators, the patterns of relativities arising from the interaction of welfare regimes 
and HRP PES, variation in the latter within regime and across regimes. 
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Table 3: Logistic Regressions relating to Variation Across Welfare Regime in the 
Impact of Principal Economic Status of the HRP National and European ‘At Risk of 
Poverty’ (ARP)  and Consistent Poverty (CP) 
 National 
ARP 
National 
CP 
EU ARP 
 
EU CP Mixed 
CP 
 odds 
ratios 
odds 
ratios 
odds 
ratios 
odds 
ratios 
odds 
ratios 
Social Democratic (ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Corporatist 1.102* 1.377 1.169* 1.815 1.695* 
Liberal 1.206** 1.927 0.998 n.s 1.269 n.s 1.343 
Southern European 2.614 4.689 5.834 9.626 4.932 
Post –socialist Corporatist 1.832 2.474 23.083 39.386 5.475 
Post –socialist Liberal 2.253 4.187 46.019 54.913 7.001 
      
Part-time Employees  2.372 3.567 2.096 2.462 3.417 
Retired 2.622 2.456 1.652 1.941 2.244 
Inactive 3.541 6.394 2.555 4.708 6.369 
Ill/disabled 2.756 7.650 1.883 4.853 7.071 
Unemployed 9.177 24.581 7.756 22.599 26.073 
      
Retired*C 0.934 n.s 0.851 n.s 1.329** 0.960 n.s 0.963 n.s 
Retired*L 1.791 1.005 n.s 2.335 1.036 n.s 0.964 n.s 
Retired*SE 0.650 0.577 0.982 n.s 0.781 n.s 0.668 
Retired*PSC 0.394 0.593 0.867* 0.767* 0.485 
Retired*PSL 1.056 n.s 0.928 n.s 3.598 1.309* 1.270* 
Inactive*C 1.471** 1.334 n.s 2.193 1.885* 1.156 n.s 
Inactive*L 2.800 2.703 3.524 3.918 2.997 
Inactive/*SE 0.814 n.s 0.491 0.986 n.s 0.512* 0.427 
Inactive/*PSC 1.250 n.s 1.099 n.s 1.906 0.882 n.s 0.829 n.s 
Inactive*PSL 1.410* 1.063 n.s 1.087 n.s 0.487* 0.777 n.s 
Ill/disabled*C 2.476 1.629** 3.565 2.313 1.674** 
Ill/disabled*L 3.608 2.337 3.915 2.763 2.469 
Ill/disabled*SE 1.089 n.s 0.541** 1.432* 0.808 n.s 0.580** 
Ill/disabled*PSC 1.064 n.s 0.668* 3.330 1.127 n.s 0.573 
Ill/disabled**PSL 2.085 0.922 n.s 3.319 0.840 n.s 0.887 n.s 
Unemployed*C 1.136 n.s 0.913 n.s 1.262* 0.885 n.s 0.796 n.s 
Unemployed*L 2.454 1.300 n.s 2.295 1.624* 1.409 n.s 
Unemployed*SE 0.485 0.249 0.555 0.245 0.226 
Unemployed*PSC 0.930 n.s 0.544 0.564 0.243 0.416 
Unemployed*PSL 0.858 0.414 0.802 n.s 0.216 0.367 
Reduction in log 
likelihood for linear model 
3,190.1 1,735 3,344.2 2,429.2 2,412 
Degrees of freedom 20 20 20 20 20 
Nagelkerke R2 .117 .147 .334 .307 .157 
N 516,534 504,120 516,534 504,120 504,120 
All significant at p<0.001 except ,** P< .01, *P < .1  
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National ‘At Risk of Poverty’ (NARP) 
 
Focusing first on, in Figure 1A we illustrate the pattern of odds ratios in relation to 
combinations of HRP PES and welfare regime. Full-time employees in the social 
democratic regime are the reference category. These outcomes are produced by the 
combined impact of both welfare regime and HRP PES. Earlier we noted that 
variation in poverty levels across welfare regimes using the NARP indicator was 
counterintuitive. This continues to be the case when we look within categories of HRP 
PES. For employees, variation across welfare regimes is rather modest with the 
highest odds ratio of 2.6 being observed for the southern European regime. Since we 
have kept the impact of part-time employment constant across regime, the odds on 
being ‘at risk of poverty’ is in each case raised by a factor of 2.4.  However, from 
Table 3 we can see that for all other categories of PES the impact on being ‘at risk of 
poverty’ is significantly greater for those in liberal welfare regimes. Being ill/disabled 
or inactive has a relatively strong effect in the corporatist regime but not 
unemployment. For post-socialist liberal regime the impact of being inactive or 
ill/disabled is also greater than in the case of the social democratic regime. Inactivity 
also has a stronger impact in the case of post-socialist corporatist regime but 
unemployment has a significantly weaker effect.  
 
The impact of being inactive, retired and particularly being unemployed are relatively 
weak in the Southern European regime and indeed are lower that we might have 
expected on the basis of our prior expectations. As we will see, this is a pattern that 
recurs across indicators. On reflection this may arise because our focus is on 
household reference persons rather than individuals and earnings. Segmented labour 
markets in Spain and Italy involving sharp insider-outsider divisions which operate 
particularly to the disadvantage of younger workers interact with entitlement 
conditions so that those who benefit from segmented labour markets are likely to 
benefit disproportionately from the benefit system. The household reference persons 
we identify as excluded from the labour market may constitute a particularly favoured 
subset of the excluded. At the same time a segmented labour market is likely to 
contribute to higher ‘at risk of poverty’ rates among individuals where HRPs are full-
time employees.x This feature combined with high levels of intergenerational co-
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residence may play a role in producing the relatively modest employment status 
differentials we observe for the southern European regime. xi  
 
The consequences of these combined effects is that, as shown in Figure 1A, relative to 
individuals in households with full-time employees in the social democratic regime, 
the highest odds on being poor among the retired of 5.7 and 6.2 are observed for the 
liberal and post-socialist liberal regimes. This is also true for the inactive category 
where the respective odds ratios are 12.0 and 11.2 and for unemployment where the 
respective figures are 27.2 and 17.7. In each case the social democratic regime 
occupies the most favourable position followed in the case of inactivity and, to a 
lesser extent for unemployment, by the corporatist regime. The southern European 
and post-socialist corporatist regimes occupy similar positions in relation to inactivity 
and illness/disability with both having rates rather lower than might be expected. The 
latter, however, occupies a less favourable position in relation to unemployment. 
 
Figure 1A: Between Welfare Regime Variation in Levels of National ‘At Risk  of 
Poverty’ by HRP PES (odds ratios relative to full-time employed HRPs in the social 
democratic regime) 
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The foregoing results arise from the combined impact of welfare regime and HRP 
PES. At this point we focus on within regime relativities and in Figure 1B we set out 
the pattern of relativities when full-time employees in each welfare regime are taken 
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as the reference category. By far the sharpest differentials are observed for the liberal 
regime. Individuals in that cluster located in households where the HRP is 
unemployed are 22.5 times more likely than those with HRPS in full-time 
unemployment to be ‘at risk of poverty, this figure does not rise above 10.4 for any of 
the remaining regimes. The liberal regime also exhibits the highest relativities relating 
to retirement, inactivity and illness/disability ranging from 4.7 to 9.9. Although for 
these categories the increment over the next highest values is nearer to 1.5 than 3. In 
each case the values for the corporatist cluster comes closest to those observed for the 
liberal regime. In contrast, the southern European regime consistently displays low 
values. The remaining regimes occupy intermediate positions with ranking depending 
on the category under consideration, with the retired occupying a particularly 
favourable position in the post-socialist conservative cluster and the ill/disabled being 
afforded a comparable position in the social democratic group.  
 
Figure 1B: HRP PES Relativities for National ’At Risk of Poverty’ by Welfare Regime 
(odds ratios relative to full-time employees in each welfare regime) 
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Thus variation across welfare regimes for the NARP deviates from what we would 
expect to be produced by a valid poverty indicator. Comparable levels of poverty for 
the liberal and post-socialist regimes arise, despite the less favourable position of 
employees in the latter, because of the substantially higher relative penalties 
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associated with exclusion from the labour market in the former. Variation by PES 
within welfare regimes is broadly in line with our expectations with the strongest 
contrasts in terms of labour market exclusion effects being associated with the liberal 
regime and the weakest with the post-socialist clusters and, most particularly, the 
southern European regime.  
 
National Consistent Poverty 
 
At this point we shift our focus to national consistent poverty (NCP) defined in purely 
relative terms. In comparison with the earlier NARP results, we find that between 
regime differences for employees are sharper, particularly in relation to the southern 
European and post-socialist liberal regimes. Differentials relating to the impact of the 
categories reflecting labour market exclusions regimes are also more striking. 
However, this increased differentiation is less pronounced for the southern European 
and post-socialist regimes. Thus the shift to NCP measure heightens the relative 
differences between employees across regimes a good deal more than those relating to 
the remaining categories.  
 
The combined impact of welfare regime and HRP PES is illustrated in Figure 2A. The 
cumulative effects are substantially greater than in the case of the NARP indicator. 
Thus the odds on individuals in households with unemployed HRPs in the post-
socialist corporatist and liberal regimes experiencing NCP are 33.1 and 42.6 times 
higher than those relating to full-time employees in the social democratic regime. The 
corresponding figures for the NARP indicator are 15.6 and 17.7. For the inactive and 
ill/disabled categories in the post-socialist liberal regime the odds relative to the 
reference category rise to 28.5 and 29.5 respectively compared to 11.2 and 12.9 in the 
case of NARP. However, as with the NARP measure, the sharpest differential 
involves unemployed in the liberal regime whose observed odds are 61.6 times higher 
than full-time employees in the social democratic regime.  
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Figure 2A: Between Welfare Regime Variation  in Levels of National Consistent 
Poverty  by HRP PES  (odds ratios relative to  full-time employed HRPs in the social 
democratic regime) 
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
Full-time
employees
Part-time
Employees
Retired Inactive Ill/disabled Unemployed
Social Democratic (ref) Corporatist Liberal
Southern European Post –socialist Corporatist Post –socialist Liberal
 
 
The substantially sharper pattern of overall disparities reflects the increase in the 
cumulative impact of welfare regime and HRP PES effects for the NCP indicator. 
However, the impact on regime variation within PES categories is more variable. For 
employees the disparity between the social democratic regime and the post-socialist 
liberal and southern regimes increase from 2.3 and 2.6 respectively to in turn 4.2 and 
4.7. For the similar comparison involving the unemployed, while absolute odds ratios 
increase substantially, very little change is observed in the pattern of regime 
relativities which remain out of line with our expectations. 
 
When we shift our focus to within regime relativities, we find that, as in the case of 
NARP, the sharpest differentials are observed for the liberal regime followed by the 
corporatist and social democratic regimes. However, in this case they are much more 
sharply distinguished from the remaining regimes. Within the liberal cluster, the odds 
on experiencing NCP are 32 times higher for the unemployed category than for full-
time employees. This falls slightly to 24.6 for the social democratic group and to 22.4 
for the corporatist cluster. A further sharp fall to 13.4 is observed for the post-socialist 
corporatist regime and to 10.2 for its liberal counterpart. Finally the lowest value of 
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6.1 is associated with the southern European regime. Comparable variation within the 
inactive and ill/disabled categories is a good deal more modest and the position of the 
liberal regime is more distinctive. The odds ratios for the latter are respectively two to 
three times higher than for any of the three least affluent clusters. While the respective 
figures for the corporatist cluster are in each case higher than for the latter regimes.  
 
Figure 2B: HRP PES Relativities for National Consistent Poverty by Welfare Regime 
(odds ratios relative to full-time employees in each welfare regime) 
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Overall, the NCP measure produces welfare regime differences that while more 
consistent with our prior expectations remain unsatisfactory.  
 
EU ‘At Risk of Poverty’ 
 
Switching from a national to an EU ‘at risk of poverty’ perspective leads to a 
situation, as illustrated in Figure 3, where between regime differentials, particularly 
those involving comparison of the post-socialist regimes with the remaining clusters, 
entirely over shadow within regime relativities. The latter, in fact, are remarkably 
similar to those observed for the NARP indicator with the strongest effects being 
observed for the liberal, corporatist and social democratic regimes. The only notable 
differences relates to a deterioration in the position of the retired category in post-
socialist liberal cluster and of ill/disabled group on post-socialist corporatist group. 
However, within regime variation appears remarkably modest when placed in the 
context of the between regime disparities.  
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With one exception, EUARP rates are higher for all categories of HRP PES in the 
southern European and post-socialist regimes than for all categories in the remaining 
regimes. It is necessary to accept that poverty rates for full-time employees in the 
post-socialist clusters are between one and a half and three times higher than for the 
unemployed in the corporatist and social democratic regimes. Within every category 
of PES, the post-socialist liberal group exhibit a distinctively high odds of being poor: 
followed at some distance by the post-socialist corporatist cluster and then, even 
further by the southern European cluster. Variation between the remaining regimes is 
extremely modest. For the retired and ill/disabled category the odds on experiencing 
EUARP are respectively 160 and 150 times higher on the post-socialist liberal cluster 
than in the social democratic regimes, for the remaining categories the figure ranges 
between the high thirties and high forties. For the post-socialist conservative group the 
highest disparities of 76 and 43 relate to illness/disability and being inactive. For the 
remaining categories the inequalities range between 23:1 for employees to 13:1 for 
the unemployed. 
 
In terms of within regime relativities in the effect of HRP PES, the EUARP indicator 
produces outcomes extremely similar to the NARP measure. However, such 
differences are almost irrelevant when placed in the context of the post-socialist 
regime effects. 
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Figure 3: Between Welfare Regime Variation in Levels of EU ‘At Risk of Poverty’ by 
HRP PES (odds ratios relative to full-time employed HRPs in the social democratic 
regime) 
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EU Consistent Poverty 
 
Each time we shift from a national to an EU perspective, the average welfare regime 
effects are much higher. Similarly, when we move from an ‘at risk of poverty’ 
approach to a consistent poverty perspective the average PES effects increase sharply. 
However, once again in moving from EUARP to the EUCP we observe a sharp 
pattern of interaction between welfare regime and HRP PES, with relativities relating 
to the latter being substantially weaker in the southern European and post-socialist 
clusters. However, the scale of the between regime differences dominate. 
.  
From Figure 4 we can see that, as with the EU ARP indicator, the overriding contrast 
is between the post-socialist regimes and all others with 11 of the 12 highest odds 
ratios being associated with these clusters. However, on this occasion there is much 
less divergence between the two post-socialist clusters. In relation to the comparison 
of the HRP being unemployed or ill/inactive in comparison with full-time employees 
they each experience a similar level of relative disadvantage reflected in odds ratios 
exceeding 200. For the remaining groups the relevant figure ranges from 55 for 
employees to 140 for the retired for the post-socialist liberal regime while for its 
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corporatist counterpart the range goes from 39 for employees to 164 for the inactive.  
Poverty rates for full-time employees in the post-socialist clusters are comparable to 
those for the unemployed in the more affluent regimes. 
 
The within country relativities for the liberal, social democratic and corporatist 
regimes are very similar to those prevailing in respect to the national consistent 
poverty indicator and consequently more substantial than in the case of the EUARP 
measure. For the post socialist and southern European regimes the odds ratio relating 
to the within group comparison of the unemployed with employees is approximately 5 
in each case. It rises to 20 for the corporatist group to 23 for the social democratic and 
to 37 for the liberal regime. While such effects are a good deal more substantial than 
for the EUARP measure, between regime effects are of such a magnitude as to make 
them seem modest when viewed in this context. 
 
Figure 4: Between Welfare Regime Variation in Levels of EU Consistent Poverty by 
HRP PES (odds ratios relative to full-time employed HRPs in the social democratic 
regime) 
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Mixed Consistent Poverty  
 
In this section we focus on the mixed consistent poverty measure where individuals 
are defined as poor when they are both ‘at risk of poverty’ and above the EU 
deprivation threshold that corresponds to the EUARP line. At an overall level, the 
indicator produces a pattern of between regime differentiation consistent with our 
expectations. From Figure 5A we can see that these relativities are broadly maintained 
within categories of HRP PES. 
 
Variation in the odds ratio for employees relative to those in the social democratic 
regimes rises from modest levels of 1.3 and 1.7 for the liberal and corporatist regimes 
to 4.9 for the southern European cluster and finally to 5.5 and 7.0 respectively for the 
corporatist and liberal post-socialist clusters. For the retired group the figure rises 
from 2.2 for the social democratic regime to 2.9 and 3.7 for the liberal and corporatist 
clusters to 7.4 and 6.0 for the southern European and post-socialist corporatist cluster 
before escalating to 20.0 for the post-socialist liberal regime. For the inactive group 
the odds ratio goes from 6.4 in the social democratic regime to 12.5 to the corporatist 
cluster. As with the remaining categories relating to labour market exclusion, the odds 
ratio for the southern European regime at 13.4 is relatively close to that for the 
corporatist regime. The figure for the liberal regime is substantially higher at 25.6 and 
close to that of 28.9 for the post-socialist corporatist regime. The level peaks at 34.6 
for the post-socialist liberal regime.  
 
For illness and disability the major contrast is between the social democratic regime 
and the post-socialist liberal group with odds ratios of respectively 7.1 and 43.9. For 
the remaining regimes the relevant odds ratio varies between 20.1 for the corporatist 
regime to 23.4 for the liberal cluster. The lowest odds ratio for the unemployed group 
of 26.1 again relates to the social democratic regime. It is followed, somewhat 
unexpectedly, by the southern European regime with a value of 29.1. It rises to 35.2 
for the corporatist cluster before increasing to 49.3 for the liberal regime. Further 
increases are then observed to 59.4 and 67.0 respectively for the corporatist and 
liberal post-socialist clusters. 
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The pattern of between regime relativities is broadly consistent with our expectations 
with the social democratic regime enjoying the most favourable position in every case 
and the post-liberal occupying the least favourable. The post-corporatist group is 
closest to the latter in four of the six cases while as we anticipated it enjoys a 
relatively favourable position in relation to the retired. The corporatist and liberal 
regimes display similar patterns of risk for the employee and retired categories but the 
former enjoys substantial advantages in relation to inactivity and unemployment. The 
major deviation from our prior expectations relates to the odds on such poverty for the 
southern European regime associated with being excluded from the labour market. 
One possible explanation for this outcome is that effects of labour market 
segmentation and for the HRP and household structure combine with the significant 
role of the ‘grey’ labour market in influencing both the income and deprivation 
components of the MCP indicator. 
 
Figure 5A: Between Welfare Regime Variation in Levels of Mixed Consistent Poverty 
by HRP PES (odds ratios relative to full-time employed HRPs in the social 
democratic regime) 
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As we can see from Figure 5B, the pattern of within welfare regime relativities 
relating to HRP PES is very similar to that observed in relation to the national 
consistent poverty measure with the sharpest pattern of variation being observed for 
the liberal regime, followed by the social democratic and corporatist regime. 
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Differentials are a good deal more modest for the post-socialist clusters and are 
minimised for the southern European regime. 
 
Figure 5B: HRP PES Relativities for Mixed Consistent Poverty by Welfare Regime 
(odds ratios relative to full-time employees in each welfare regime)) 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
Southern
European
Post
–socialist
Liberal
Post
–socialist
Corporatist
Corporatist Social
Democratic
(ref)
Liberal
Part-time Employees Retired Inactive
Ill/disabled Unemployed
 
The MCP measure, as well as identifying a minority as poor in each welfare regime 
and producing overall welfare regime variation along the hypothesised lines, also 
reveals patterns of within and between welfare regimes that are broadly consistent 
with our prior expectations. 
 
Economic Stress Levels by Welfare Regime and Principal Economic 
Status 
 
As a final means of assessing the relative merits of the various poverty indicators, in 
this section we consider the relationships between subjectively experienced economic 
stress and welfare regime and poverty outcomes. In Table 4 we set out the results for a 
set of regression in which welfare regime, poverty outcomes and their interactions are 
regressed on each of the five indicators. 
 
A number of key findings emerge. For all five measures, differences in level of 
economic stress among the non-poor between the post-socialist liberal regime and the 
social democratic one are less than we might have expected. However, this is 
particularly true when we focus on the EU measures and extends to the post-socialist 
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conservative cluster. The conclusion extends to the poor but with some somewhat less 
force as the relevant interactions are generally positive. The within regime impact of 
poverty is also significantly lower in every case for the corporatist regime than for the 
remaining regimes.  This reflects a pattern whereby stress levels for the poor are in 
each case similar to those for the social democratic regime while the corresponding 
levels for the non-poor are very similar to those in the liberal regime.  
 
Table 4: Logistic Regressions of Economic Stress by National and European ARP and 
Consistent Poverty 
 National 
ARP 
EU ARP National CP Mixed CP EU CP 
 Odds Ratios Odds Ratios Odds Ratios Odds Ratios Odds Ratios
Welfare 
Regime 
     
Social 
Democratic 
(ref) 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Corporatist 2.479 2.241 2.415 2.405 2.285 
Liberal 1.787 1.847 1.844 1.914 1.965 
Southern 
European 
5.400 4.619 5.862 5.772 5.186 
Post-
socialist 
Corporatist 
5.182 2.291 5.608 5.108 2.714 
Post-
socialist 
Liberal 
3.326 0.971 n.s 3.560 3.119 1.218 
Poor 3.676 2.879 11.223 10.781 9.000 
Poor*C 0.466 0.579 0.360 0.312 0.325 
Poor*L 1.146 n.s 1.552 0.910 n.s 1.232 n.s 1.605** 
Poor*SE 0.890* 1.065 n.s 0.909 n.s 0.979 n.s 1.056 n.s 
Poor*PSC 1.267 1.664 1.809 1.006 n.s 1.093 n.s 
Poor*PSL 1.213* 2.083 1.015 n.s 0.856 n.s 1.357** 
Reduction in 
log 
likelihood 
for linear 
model 
1,433.5 1,735.9 1,147.5 1,224.2 1,139.2 
Degrees of 
freedom 
5 5 5 5 4 
Nagelkerke 
R2 
.158 .170 .186 .197 .242 
N 525,472 525,472 512,904 512,904 512,904 
All significant at p<0.001 except ,** P< .01, *P < .1  
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The impact of indicators that capture consistent poverty on economic stress is in every 
regime substantially higher than for the ‘at risk of poverty’. In Figure 6 we illustrate 
welfare regime variation in the within regime impact of poverty for each of the five 
indicators. For the NARP measure the odds ratio for poor versus non-poor is 1.7 and 
for the remaining clusters it varies between 3.3 for the southern European regime and 
4.7 for the post-socialist corporatist. The figures for the EUARP indicator are 
extremely similar but rise to 6.0 for the post-socialist liberal group. For the NCP 
indicator the odds ratio for the corporatist regime is 4.0. The post-socialist corporatist 
cluster constitutes an outlier of a quite different sort in displaying an odds ratio of 
20.3. The remaining values are found in the range running from 10.2 to 11.4. For the 
EU CP measure the corporatist values is 2.9 and for the remaining regimes the figure 
goes from 9.0 to 14.4. Finally for the MCP the corporatist value is 3.4 and the 
remaining observation are located in the range running from 9.2 to 13.3. In both of the 
previous cases the highest values is associated with the liberal regime. 
 
Typically the relativities in subjective economic stress are of magnitude three times 
greater than those observed in relation to the ‘at risk of poverty’ measures. On the 
other hand, there is very little to choose between the three consistent poverty 
measures in terms of their capacity to discriminate between those experiencing 
economic stress and the remainder of the population.  
Figure 6: The Impact of Poverty by Type of Indicator within Welfare Regime (Odds 
ratios relative to reference category of non-poor within each regime) 
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Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have sought to assess the extent to which the relative merits of 
different poverty indicators can be illuminated by considering welfare regime and 
socio-economic variation poverty levels and patterns and in the consequences of 
different poverty outcomes for subjectively experienced economic stress. 
 
In pursuing this objective, we have considered indicators of ‘at risk of poverty’ and 
consistent poverty at both national and EU levels together with a mixed consistent 
poverty measure that combines information on relative income at the national level 
with relative material deprivation. In assessing the construct validity of the various 
indicators, we have taken into account patterns of between and within welfare regime 
variation and relationships to subjective economic stress.  
 
For the national ‘at risk of poverty’ we observe the counterintuitive pattern of 
variation in relation to level of prosperity of the welfare regimes that has led 
governments to be reluctant to accept it as appropriate social indication. Patterns of 
association with HRP PES and economic stress take the expected form but the 
strength of the associations is weaker than in the case of the consistent poverty 
indicators. The impact of HRP PES is strongest for the liberal regime and weakest for 
the southern European with the retired enjoying particular advantage in the corporatist 
regimes. Crucially between regime variation continues to display a counterintuitive 
pattern within categories of HRP PES. 
 
Switching to a consistent poverty perspective reduces the level of poverty but does 
nothing to produce a set of welfare regime difference more consistent with our prior 
expectations. In each case the limited ability of the NARP to capture exclusion from 
customary living patterns and activities due to a lack of resources is reflected in the 
limited overlap between falling below the national income threshold and being found 
above the corresponding deprivation benchmark. However, contrary to the argument 
that the limitations of the NARP are directly related to EU enlargement it is actually 
least effective in capturing the most deprived in the social democratic and corporatist 
regimes. Since the overlap is rather similar in the liberal and post-socialist regimes 
their relative position is unaffected. Variation across categories of HRP PES are  
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much sharper than in the case of NARP and the pattern of interaction whereby the 
impact of labour market exclusions is a good deal sharper than in the more affluent 
welfare regimes is also much more pronounced and the relationship to economic 
stress is substantially stronger. On the grounds of its ability to capture within country 
relativities the NCP measure is clearly preferable but neither produces the kind of 
between regime variation that we might expect of a valid measure of poverty either 
overall or within PES categories. 
 
Shifting to an EU ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator produces the desired differentiation 
between welfare regimes in terms of levels of prosperity.  However, this progress 
comes at the price of this contrast entirely dominating results. It becomes necessary to 
accepting that between two-thirds to three-quarters of those in the post-socialist 
regimes are to be counted as poor and that full-time employees in these clusters are 
more likely to experience such poverty than the unemployed in the more affluent 
regimes. These outcomes are less stark when one adopts a multidimensional 
perspective with substantially greater variation in relation to both HRP PES and 
economic stress. However, it remains necessary to accept that 40 per cent of the post 
socialist cluster are in poverty and that full-time employees in these regimes are at 
least equally likely to experience poverty as the unemployed in the affluent regimes.  
The evidence provides further support for the conclusion of Marlier et al (2007-154-
155) that a EU-wide approach by failing to take into account differences in “the 
significance of goods in social functioning” would miss people in richer countries 
who are experiencing genuine exclusion from their own society while counting 
substantial numbers in the poorer societies who are not experiencing such exclusion.  
 
The mixed consistent poverty indicator produces a significant pattern of 
differentiation between welfare regimes in line with our prior expectations. Clear 
patterns of differentiation are also observed in relation to HRP PES. In addition, 
welfare regime relativities are broadly maintained with categories of HRP PES. As 
with the other consistent poverty measures, PES effects are strongest in the liberal 
regime and its distinctive character is seen to lie not in high levels of poverty as such 
but in the scale of disadvantage associated with labour market exclusion and, in 
particular unemployment. In contrast, in the southern European and post-socialist 
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regimes higher overall levels of MCP are accompanied by weaker within regime PES 
differentials with the consequence that between regime differentials are sharper for 
full-time employees that for those excluded from the labour market. Levels of poverty 
for the full-time employed are significantly lower than for the unemployed 
irrespective of which regime we consider. Finally those exposed to MCP are 
substantially more likely to experience economic stress and this is particularly true for 
both liberal regimes.  
 
Our findings lead us to agree with Fahey (2007) that in understanding poverty in an 
enlarged EU it is necessary to consider indicators other than the ‘at risk of poverty’ 
measure. However, our analysis suggests that the EU-wide ‘at risk of poverty’ 
measure based on 60 per cent of median equivalent income in the EU as a whole 
proposed by Fahey (2007:45) would prove to be a less than ideal choice. Instead we 
propose using a measure such as the mixed consistent poverty measure developed 
here. The latter, in particular, unlike the EU ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator produces a 
set of results that are largely in line with our expectations of how a valid poverty 
measure should behave. Such an approach would allow us to achieve the stated EU 
objective of assessing the scale of exclusion from minimally acceptable level of 
standards of living in individual countries while also assessing the extent to which the 
whole population of Europe is sharing in the benefits of high average prosperity. 
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